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Abstract
Deep neural networks are vulnerable to adver-
sarial examples, which dramatically alter model
output using small input changes. We propose
NeuralFingerprinting, a simple, yet effective
method to detect adversarial examples by veri-
fying whether model behavior is consistent with
a set of secret fingerprints, inspired by the use
of biometric and cryptographic signatures. The
benefits of our method are that 1) it is fast, 2) it is
prohibitively expensive for an attacker to reverse-
engineer which fingerprints were used, and 3) it
does not assume knowledge of the adversary. In
this work, we pose a formal framework to an-
alyze fingerprints under various threat models,
and characterize NeuralFingerprinting for linear
models. For complex neural networks, we empiri-
cally demonstrate that NeuralFingerprinting sig-
nificantly improves on state-of-the-art detection
mechanisms by detecting the strongest known ad-
versarial attacks with 98-100% AUC-ROC scores
on the MNIST, CIFAR-10 and MiniImagenet (20
classes) datasets. In particular, the detection accu-
racy of NeuralFingerprinting generalizes well to
unseen test-data under various black- and white-
box threat models, and is robust over a wide range
of hyperparameters and choices of fingerprints.
1. Introduction
Deep neural networks are highly effective pattern-
recognition models for many applications, such as computer
vision, speech recognition and sequential decision-making.
However, neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial ex-
amples: an attacker can add small perturbations to input
data, that maximally change the model’s output (Szegedy
et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2014). Hence, a key chal-
lenge is how to make neural networks reliable and robust for
large-scale applications in noisy environments or mission-
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Figure 1. Detecting adversarial examples using NeuralFP with
N = 2 fingerprints, forK-class classification. NeuralFP separates
real data x (top) from adversarial examples x′ = x+ η (bottom)
by 1) adding N perturbations ∆xi, (i = 1, . . . , N) to each input,
and 2) comparing model features ϕ(x+∆xi) withK sets of valid
fingerprints ϕ(x) + ∆yi,j , (j = 1 . . .K). If a match is found, it
classifies the input as “real” (x), and if not, flags it “fake” (x′).
critical applications, such as autonomous vehicles. To make
neural networks robust against adversarial examples, we
propose NeuralFingerprinting (NeuralFP): a fast, secure
and effective method to detect adversarial examples.
The key intuition for NeuralFP is that we can encode secret
fingerprint patterns into the behavior of a neural network
around the input data. This pattern characterizes the net-
work’s expected behavior around real data and can thus
be used to reject fake data, where the model outputs are
not consistent with the expected fingerprint outputs. This
process is shown in Figure 1.
This approach is highly effective as encoding fingerprints
is feasible and simple to implement during training, and
evaluating fingerprints is computationally cheap. NeuralFin-
gerprinting is secure: to craft a successful adversarial exam-
ple, an attacker would have to find input perturbations that
significantly change the network’s output, and do not violate
the secret fingerprints. However, it is computationally and
statistically expensive for an attacker to reverse-engineer the
secret fingerprints used, and random attacks have low prob-
ability of success. Furthermore, NeuralFingerprinting does
not require knowledge of the adversary’s attack method, and
differs from state-of-the-art methods (Meng & Chen, 2017;
Xingjun Ma, 2018) that detect adversarial examples using
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auxiliary classifiers.
In this work, we theoretically characterize the feasibility and
security of NeuralFP, and experimentally validate that Neu-
ralFP achieves almost perfect detection AUC scores against
state-of-the-art adversarial attacks on various datasets. To
summarize, our key contributions are:
• We present NeuralFP: a simple and secure method
to detect adversarial examples that does not rely on
knowledge of the attack mechanism.
• We describe a formal framework to characterize the
hardness of reverse-engineering fingerprint patterns
and characterize the effectiveness of NeuralFP for lin-
ear classification.
• We empirically demonstrate that NeuralFP achieves
state-of-the-art near-perfect AUC-scores against the
strongest known adversarial attacks. In particular, we
show that NeuralFP correctly distinguishes between
unseen test data and adversarial examples.
• We emprically show that the performance of NeuralFP
is robust to the choice of fingerprints and is effective
for a wide range of choices of fingerprints and hyper-
parameters.
• We also show that NeuralFP can be robust even in the
whitebox-attack setting, where an adaptive attacker has
knowledge of the fingerprint data.
Source code is available at https://github.com/
StephanZheng/neural-fingerprinting.
2. Fingerprinting for Adversarial Defense
We consider supervised classification, where we aim to learn
a model f(x; θ) from labeled data
{
(xi, y∗i)
}
i∈I , where
x ∈ Rd and y is a 1-hot label vector y ∈ {0, 1}K (K
classes). The model f predicts class probabilities P (y|x; θ):
f(x; θ)j =
exph(x)j∑
l exph(x)l
, (1)
with logits h(x) ∈ RK and can be learned via a loss function
L(x, y; θ), e.g. cross-entropy loss. Formally, this data is
generated by sampling from a data-generating distribution
p(x, y), which characterizes “real” data (p(x, y) > 0).
Adversarial attacks produce perturbations that exploit the
behavior of a neural network at an input point x, in partic-
ular when x is a high-dimensional vector. An adversarial
perturbation ∆x causes a large change in model output, i.e.
for δ,  > 0:
‖∆x‖ < δ, ‖f(x+ ∆x)− f(x)‖ > , (2)
Algorithm 1 NeuralFP
1: Input: example x, comparison function D (see Eqn 9).
2: Input: threshold τ > 0.
3: Input: (secret)
{(
∆xi,∆yi,j
)}
i=1...N,j=1...K
.
4: Output: accept / reject.
5: if ∃j : D(x, f, ξi,j) ≤ τ then
6: Return: accept # x is real
7: else
8: Return: reject # x is fake
9: end if
such that e.g. the class predicted by the model changes:
k′ = argmax
j
f(x+ ∆x)j 6= argmax
j
f(x)j = k. (3)
We define such data (x′) to be “fake”, i.e. formally
p(x′, argmax
j
f(x′; θ)j) = 0. (4)
For instance, the Fast-Gradient Sign Method (Goodfellow
et al., 2014) perturbs x to x+ ∆x along the gradient
∆x =  · sign ∂L(x, y; θ)
∂x
,  > 0. (5)
Neural Fingerprinting. Our goal is to defend neural net-
works by robustly detecting adversarial examples. Specifi-
cally, we introduce NeuralFP: a method that detects whether
an input-output pair (x, yˆ) is consistent with the data distri-
bution (“real”), or is adversarial (“fake”). This algorithm is
summarized in Algorithm 1 and Figure 1.
The key idea of NeuralFP is to detect adversarial inputs by
checking if the network output in specific points around x
closely resembles a set of fingerprints that can be chosen by
the defender. These chosen outputs are embedded into the
network during training. Formally, a fingerprint ξ is:
ξ = (∆x,∆y). (6)
For K-class classifcation, we define a set of fingerprints:
ξi,j = (∆xi,∆yi,j), i = 1, . . . , N, j = 1, . . . ,K, (7)
where ξi,j is the ith fingerprint for class j. Here, the ∆xi
(∆yi,j) are input (output) perturbations that are chosen by
the defender. Note that across classes j = 1, 2 . . . ,K, we
use the same input directions ∆xi.
NeuralFP acts as follows: it classifies a new input x′ as
real if the change in model output F (x′ + ∆xi) is close
to the ∆yi,j for some class j, for all i. Here, we use a
comparison function D and threshold τ > 0 to define the
level of agreement required, i.e. we declare x′ real when
x′ is real⇔ ∃j : D(x, f, ξ·,j) ≤ τ. (8)
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As the comparison function D, we take:
D(x, f, ξ·,j) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
‖F (x,∆xi)−∆yi,j‖2 (9)
F (x,∆xi) = ϕ(x+ ∆xi)− ϕ(x), (10)
ϕ(x) =
h(x)
‖h(x)‖ , (11)
where ϕ(x) are normalized logits. Hence, NeuralFP is
defined by the data:
NFP = (ξ,D, τ) . (12)
Encoding Fingerprints. Once a defender has constructed
a set of desired fingerprints (7), the chosen fingerprints
can be embedded in the network’s response by adding a
fingerprint regression loss during training. We elaborate on
how to choose fingerprints hereafter. Given a classification
model (1) with logits h(x) ∈ RK , the fingerprint loss is:
Lfp(x, y, ξ; θ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
‖F (x,∆xi)−∆yi,k‖22, (13)
where k is the ground truth class for example x and ∆yi,k
are the fingerprint outputs. Note that we only train on the
fingerprints for the ground truth class. The total training
objective then is:
min
θ
∑
(x,y)
L0(x, y; θ) + αLfp(x, y, ξ; θ), (14)
where L0 is a loss function for the task (e.g. cross-entropy
loss for classification) and α a positive scalar. In the here-
after we will use α = 1, but in practice, we choose α such
that it balances the task and fingerprint losses.
Computational complexity. Evaluating fingerprints re-
quires O(NK) extra computation, as Algorithm 1 requires
O(NK) extra forward passes to compute the differences
F (x,∆xi). A straightforward implementation is to check
(8) iteratively for all classes, and stop whenever an agree-
ment is seen or all classes have been exhausted. However,
this operation can in principle be parallelized and performed
in minibatches for real-time applications.
2.1. Threat Model Analysis
There are several levels of threat models with increasing
levels of attacker knowledge of NFP = (η,D, τ) and the
model f(x; θ) for which we can analyze the security and
effectiveness of NeuralFP. First, we will assume that the
attacker has access to the parameters θ and can query the
model f(x; θ) and its derivatives without limitation.
We can then characterize the security and feasibility of
NeuralFP in both the whitebox-attack (attacker has per-
fect knowledge of NFP) and blackbox-attack setting (at-
tacker knows nothing about NFP but is aware of the model
weights). For example, a physical instance of a whitebox-
attack occurs when the attacker has access to the compute
instance where the forward passes f(x; θ) are executed (e.g.
the model f(x; θ) is queried on a local device). In this case,
it should be assumed that the attacker can get access to the
precise fingerprints that are used by the defender, e.g. by
reading the raw memory state. A blackbox-attack might
occur when the internal state of the compute instance is
shielded, e.g. when f(x; θ) is queried in the cloud.
Additionally, we define the notion of whitebox-defense
(the defender has knowledge of the attacker’s strategy) and
blackbox-defense (defender has no knowledge about at-
tacker).
Whitebox-attack. If the attacker has full knowledge of
the fingerprint data NFP, a key question is how vulnerable
the model is, i.e. how many example x′-s can an attacker
find that will be falsely flagged as “real”?
Firstly, we will demonstrate in Theorem 1 that for Support
Vector Machines (binary classification with linear models),
we can characterize the region of inputs that will be clas-
sified as “real” for a given set of fingerprints ξi.j and to
what extent this corresponds with the support of the data
distribution p(x, y).
Secondly, a whitebox-attacker could use knowledge of NFP
to adaptively construct adversarial examples using gradient-
based methods. However, we will show empirically in Sec-
tion 3.4 that such methods have low odds of success.
Blackbox-attack. In the blackbox-attack setting, the at-
tacker has no knowledge of NFP, i.e. does not know the
metricD, threshold τ , and (the numberNK of) fingerprints
ξi.j =
(
∆xi,∆yi.j
)
. An attacker would 1) have to find the
fingerprints used by the defender and then 2) construct ad-
versarial examples that are compatible with the fingerprints.
First, to reverse-engineer the fingerprints ξ, it is intuitive to
see this is combinatorially and statistically hard. Consider
a simple case where only the ∆yi.j are unknown, and that
the attacker knows that each fingerprint is discrete, i.e. each
component ∆yi.jk = ±1. Then the attacker would have to
search over combinatorially (O(2NK)) many ∆y to find the
subset of ∆y that satisfy the detection criterion in equation
(8). A defender can shrink this space of feasible fingerprints
by setting the threshold level of τ . Hence, we conjecture
that reverse-engineering the set of feasible fingerprints for a
general model class f(x; θ) is exponentially hard, but leave
a full proof for future research.
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Figure 2. Geometry of fingerprints for support vector machines
with binary labeled data that are separable by the hyperplane
〈w, x〉 + b = 0. The distances δmax± (δmin± ) denote the maxi-
mal (minimal) distances of the positive (x+) and negative (x−)
examples to the hyperplane. The fingerprint ∆x1 with 〈∆x1, e〉 =
δmin− will have f(x− + ∆x) < 0 and f(x−) < 0 for all x− in
the data distribution (red region), i.e. always never a change in
prediction (except for support vectors). Hence, ∆x1 will flag all
x′ in the shaded blue regions −δmin− < 〈x′, e〉 < 0 as “fake”,
since for those x′ it will always see a change in predicted class.
Similarly, ∆x2 with 〈∆x2, e〉 = δmax− always sees a class change
for real x−, and thus flags all x′ with 〈x′, e〉 < −δmax− as “fake”.
Secondly, a successful attacker needs to construct x′ =
x+ ∆x that maximizes the loss:
max
x′
L(x′, y; θ), such that ∃j : D(x′, f, ξ·,j) < τ, (15)
ensuring that the model outputs
{
f(x′ + ∆xi)
}
are τ -close
to the fingerprints
{
∆yi,j
}
for some class j. This poses a
difficult constrained optimization problem, where the feasi-
ble set of x′ is non-convex. Hence, in general it is hard for
a random attacker to succeed, i.e. find a feasible solution.
In particular, the constrained optimization (15) shows intu-
itively that a random attack would likely fail, as the feasible
set of x′ can be made reasonably small for small thresholds
τ (we show in 3.1 (e.g. Figure 5) small thresholds do not
significantly impact the robustness of NeuralFP).
2.2. Characterizing Fingerprints
We now investigate the effect of fingerprints and to what ex-
tent fingerprints characterize data distributions. In particular,
given fingerprint data NFP as in (12), can we characterize
which inputs x will be classified as “real”, how that de-
pends on the number N of fingerprints and how efficient
fingerprints are?
Support Vector Machines. To do so, we first consider
fingerprints for Support Vector Machines, i.e. binary classi-
fication with linear models f :
f(x) = 〈w, x〉+ b, yˆ = sign f(x), (16)
on inputs x ∈ Rn, where n 1 (e.g. n = 900 for MNIST):
The binary classifier defines a hyperplane f(x) = 0, which
aims to separate positive (yˆ = +1) from negative exam-
ples (yˆ = −1). We will assume that the data-generating
distribution p(x) for the positive and negative examples is
perfectly separated by a hyperplane, defined by the normal
e = w‖w‖ , ‖e‖ = 1. We define the minimal and maximal
distance from the examples to the hyperplane along e as:
δmin± = min
a:ya=±1
|〈xa, e〉| , δmax± = max
a:ya=±1
|〈xa, e〉|
(17)
In this setting, the set of x classified as “real” by fingerprints
is determined by the geometry of f(x), where for detection
we measure the exact change in predicted class (e.g. we use
h(x) = sign (〈w, x〉+ b) and τ = 0). Theorem 1 below
then characterizes fingerprints for SVMs:
Theorem 1 (Decision Boundaries of Fingerprints for Sup-
port Vector Machines). Assume the metric D is as in equa-
tions (9-11), e.g. measure first-order differences, τ = 0, and
use h(x) = sign (〈w, x〉+ b). Let e = w‖w‖ . For support
vector machines with separable data, the set of fingerprints
(∆x1 = λ1e,∆y
1,− = 0), λ1 = δmin− (18)
(∆x2 = λ2e,∆y
2,− = +2), λ2 = δmax− (19)
(∆x3 = λ3e,∆y
3,+ = −2), λ3 = −δmax+ (20)
(∆x4 = λ4e,∆y
4,+ = 0), λ4 = −δmin+ (21)
will detect adversarial perturbations x′ = x±+ η as “fake”
for which one the following hold:{
〈x′, e〉 > δmax+ , 0 < 〈x′, e〉 < δmin+ ,
〈x′, e〉 < −δmax− , −δmin− < 〈x′, e〉 < 0,
(22)
This choice of λs is optimal: these fingerprints minimize the
set of inputs x that can be misclassified as “real” using a
first-order metric D.
Proof. We illustrate this proof for two fingerprints in Fig-
ure 2. Consider any perturbation η = λe that is positively
aligned with w, and has 〈η, e〉 = δmin− . Then for any nega-
tive example (x−,−1) (except for the support vectors that
lie exactly δmin− from the hyperplane), adding the perturba-
tion η does not change the class prediction:
sign f(x−) = −1, sign f(x− − η) = −1. (23)
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The fingerprint in (18) is an example of such an η. However,
if λ is large enough, that is:
〈η, e〉 = δmax− , (24)
(e.g. the fingerprint in (19)), for all negative examples
(x−,−1) the class prediction will always change (except
for the x− that lie exactly δmax− from the hyperplane):
sign f(x−) = −1, sign f(x− + η) = +1, (25)
Note that if η has a component smaller (or larger) than δmin± ,
it will exclude fewer (more) examples, e.g. those that lie
closer to (farther from) the hyperplane. Similar observations
hold for fingerprints (20) and (21) and the positive examples
x+. Hence, it follows that for any x that lies too close to the
hyperplane (closer than δmin± ), or too far (farther than δ
max
± ),
the model output after adding the four fingerprints will never
perfectly correspond to their behavior on examples x from
the data distribution. For instance, for any x that is closer
than δmin+ to the hyperplane, (21) will always cause a change
in class, while none was expected. Similar observations hold
for the other regions in (22). Since the SVM is translation
invariant parallel to the hyperplane, the fingerprints can only
distinguish examples based on their distance perpendicular
to the hyperplane. Hence, this choice of λs is optimal.
Note that Theorem 1 by itself does not prevent attacks paral-
lel to the decision boundary; an adversary could in principle
add a (large) perturbation η that pushes a negative example
x− across the SVM decision boundary to a region where the
data distribution p(x−+η, y) = 0, but which is classified as
positive by the SVM, i.e. sign f(x− + η) = +1. However,
we can further prevent attacks that stray far from the data
distribution, e.g. that go too far in a direction parallel to the
hyperplane, by checking the distance to the nearest example
in the dataset. This essentially would restrict the adver-
sary to perturbations of limited magnitude, i.e. ‖η‖ < ,
although could be computationally expensive.
Imperfect Classifiers. In addition, Theorem 1 assumed
that the data was perfectly separable. However, if this is not
the case and there are misclassified examples x˜, when using
exact matching, the fingerprints would not detect adversarial
perturbations correctly for misclassified examples and flag
x˜ itself as fake. However, we observed empirically that
this problem is ameliorated when using soft matching and
nonlinear models, although theoretically characterizing this
is an interesting question for future research.
Nonlinear Models. For the general setting, e.g. for non-
linear models f , Theorem 1 can be extended if the data is
(locally) separable in some feature space Φ and we can write
a general (local) model as
y = 〈w, φ(x)〉+ b. (26)
In this case, the fingerprints can be defined analogous to
(20-19). As such, it is straightforward to lift the analysis of
Theorem 1 to this setting as well. However, depending on
the feature space Φ chosen, such as analysis might only be
applicable to a local region of the input space and require
more complex fingerprints.
2.3. Choosing and Encoding Fingerprints.
When applying NeuralFP to complex models such as deep
neural networks, a key challenge is how to choose the fin-
gerprints ξ such that the region of inputs x that are classified
as “real” corresponds as much as possible with the support
of the data distribution p(x).
Theorem 1 characterizes fingerprints for SVMs, where for
detection we used the exact change in predicted class. How-
ever, in practice using exact class changes is challenging.
First, the feature space Φ can be highly complex (e.g. for
deep neural networks) and hence intractable to describe the
geometry of the decision boundaries of f(x; θ). However,
NeuralFP utilizes a softer notion of fingerprint matching by
checking whether the model outputs match (a pattern of)
changes in logits as in equation (10), which can be learned
by the model during training.
In this work, we focus on deep neural networks that have
high model capacity, such that fitting almost arbitrary fin-
gerprint patterns accurately is a feasible goal1.
Fingerprints Sampling Strategies. In particular, this mo-
tivates a general and straightforward method to construct
the N fingerprints ξi,j =
(
∆xi,∆yi,j
)
, e.g. by randomly
sampling directions ∆xi, and encouraging constancy and/or
changes to another class (e.g. (20-19) for positive examples
in the SVM case). For example, a simple choice of finger-
prints that increases class probabilities along ∆xi uses 1-hot
vectors:
∆xi ∼ N (0, ), ∆yi,j = 1 [j′ = j] ,  > 0, (27)
although more complex choices are feasible as well. We
will show in Section 3.3 that the performance of NeuralFP
is robust over a wide range of fingerprints ξ.
3. Evaluating the detection of adversarial
attacks
We now empirically validate the effectiveness of NeuralFP,
as well as analyze the behavior and robustness of NeuralFP2.
Our goal is to answer the following questions:
1In fact, (Zhang et al., 2016) has shown that neural networks
can fit arbitrary random or complex patterns of prediction labels.
2Code for experiments: https://github.com/
StephanZheng/neural-fingerprinting
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Data Method Defense type FGM JSMA BIM-a BIM-b CW-L2
MNIST LID Blackbox 99.68 96.36 99.05 99.72 98.66LID Whitebox 99.68 98.67 99.61 99.90 99.55
NeuralFP Blackbox 100.0 99.97 99.94 99.98 99.74
CIFAR-10 LID Blackbox 82.38 89.93 82.51 91.61 93.32LID Whitebox 82.38 95.87 82.30 99.78 98.94
NeuralFP Blackbox 99.96 99.91 99.91 99.95 98.87
MiniImagenet-20 NeuralFP Blackbox 99.96 - - 99.68 -
Table 1. Detection AUC-ROC against blackbox-attackers (know model f(x; θ), but not fingerprints; see Section 2.1) for MNIST, CIFAR-
10 and MiniImagenet-20 tasks on test-set ("negatives") and corresponding adversarial ("positives") samples (1328 pre-test samples each).
NeuralFP outperforms LID on MNIST and CIFAR-10 on almost all attacks, except for the CW-L2 attack. However, LID only outperforms
NeuralFP slightly in the whitebox setting, i.e. with data augmentation with CW-L2 adversarial examples, while NeuralFP is always attack
agnostic. On MiniImagenet-20, NeuralFP achieves near-perfect AUC-ROC versus FGM and BIM-b. Not all scores for MiniImagenet-20
are reported: 1) attacks are prohibitively slow (JSMA, CW-L2) and 2) due to time constraints, LID scores were not obtainable.
• How well does NeuralFP distinguish between normal
and adversarial examples?
• How sensitive and robust is NeuralFP to changes in
hyperparameters?
• How do the fingerprints of normal and adversarial ex-
amples differ?
• How robust is NeuralFP to a attacker that has full
knowledge of fingerprints?
• Does NeuralFP scale to high-dimensional inputs?
To do so, we report the AUC-ROC performance of Neu-
ralFP on MNIST, CIFAR-10 and MiniImagenet-20 datasets
against four state-of-the art adversarial attacks, using
(Xingjun Ma, 2018) (LID), the strongest-known detection
based defense as the baseline. We compare against LID
in both the blackbox-defense and whitebox-defense setting
(LID has knowledge of the attack mechanism and the LID
classifier has been trained on FGM examples).
Adversarial Attacks. We test on the following attacks:
• Fast Gradient Method (FGM) (Goodfellow et al., 2014)
and Basic Iterative Method (BIM) (Kurakin et al.,
2016) are both gradient based attacks with BIM being
an iterative variant of FGM. We consider both BIM-a
(iterates until misclassification has been achieved) and
BIM-b (iterates a fixed number of times (50)).
• Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) (Paper-
not et al., 2015) iteratively perturbs two pixels at a time,
based on a saliency map.
• Carlini-Wagner Attack (CW-L2): an optimization-
based attack, is one of the strongest known attacks
(Carlini & Wagner, 2016), which has broken many
state-of-the-art defenses. (Carlini & Wagner, 2017a).
For each dataset, we consider a randomly sampled pre-
test-set of 1328 test-set images, and discard misclassified
pre-test images. For the test-set of remaining images, we
generate adversarial perturbations by applying each of the
above mentioned attacks. We report AUC-ROC on sets
composed in equal measures of the test-set and test-set
adversarial examples with varying threshold τ . See the
appendix for details regarding all model architectures used
and construction of MiniImagenet-20.
3.1. Effectiveness
MNIST We trained a 5-layer ConvNet to 99.3±0.1% test-
accuracy. The set of ∆xi ∈ R28×28 are chosen at random,
with each pixel perturbation chosen uniformly in [−, ].
For each ∆xi, if x is of label-class k, ∆yi,k ∈ R10 is
chosen to be such that ∆yi,kl 6=k = −0.235 and ∆yi,kl=k = 0.7,
with ‖∆y‖2 = 1. The AUC-ROC for the best-performing
fingerprints (best N and ) using grid-search is reported
in Table 1. We see that NeuralFP achieves near-perfect
detection with AUC-ROC of 99− 100% across all attacks.
CIFAR-10. For CIFAR-10, we trained a 7-layer ConvNet
(similar to (Carlini & Wagner, 2016)) to 85± 1% accuracy.
The ∆xi and ∆yi,j are chosen similarly as for MNIST.
Table 1 shows that in average, across attacks, NeuralFP
outperforms LID-blackbox on average by 11.77% and LID-
whitebox defense by 8%. Even in comparison with LID-
whitebox, NeuralFP is competitive (CW-L2) or outperforms
LID (other attacks).
MiniImagenet-20. To illustrate the scalability of Neu-
ralFP, we also evaluated on MiniImagenet (Vinyals et al.,
2016) with 20 classes randomly chosen from the 100 Mini-
ImageNet classes. For this, we trained an AlexNet net-
work on 10,600 images (not downsampled) with 91.1%
top-1 accuracy. We generated test-set adversarial exam-
ples using BIM-b with 50 steps (NIP) and FGM. Here,
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Figure 3. AUC-ROC performance for different hyperparameter settings (left, middle) and ROC curves (right). Top row: MNIST, bottom
row: CIFAR-10. We see that the performance of NeuralFP is robust across attacks and hyperparameters, with the AUC-ROC between
90 − 100% for most settings. The AUC-ROC is lowest versus CW-L2, which is the strongest known attack. Increasing N generally
improves performance, indicating more fingerprints frustrate attackers more. Increasing  decreases the AUC on CW-L2 only, suggesting
that as adversarial examples become of smaller magnitude, NeuralFP requires smaller detection ranges to be effective.
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Figure 4. AUC-ROC mean µ and standard-deviation σ for 32 ran-
domly sampled fingerprints (including randomizingN ) for CIFAR-
10. The AUC-ROC across all attacks varies little (σ < 1%), with
σ highest for CW-L2, suggesting NeuralFP is robust across hyper-
parameters.
NeuralFP achieves an AUC-ROC score of > 99.5% with
(N, ) = (20, 0.05) on both attacks, similar to the near-
perfect AUC-ROC for MNIST and CIFAR-10.
Visualization. In Figure 5 we visualize the fingerprint-
loss for test and adversarial examples. The fingerprint-loss
differs significantly for most test and adversarial examples,
resulting in the AUC-ROC scores being close to 100%.
3.2. Sensitivity and Efficiency Analysis
Next, we study the effect of the hyper-parameters N (num-
ber of fingerprint directions) and  on the AUC-ROC for
MNIST and CIFAR-10. Figure 3 shows that NeuralFP per-
forms well across a wide range of hyperparameters and is
robust to variation in the hyperparameters. With increas-
ing , the AUC-ROC for CW-L2 decreases. A possible
explanation is that CW-L2 produces smaller adversarial per-
turbations than other attacks, and for larger , fingerprints
are less sensitive to those small adversarial perturbations.
However, the degradation in performance is not substantial
(∼ 4 − 8%) as we increase  over an order of magnitude.
With increasing N , we see that the AUC-ROC generally
increases across attacks. We conjecture that a larger num-
ber of fingerprints are sensitive to perturbations in a larger
number of directions, and hence result in better detection.
Figure 4 depicts the mean and standard deviation of AUC-
ROC scores for 32 sets of randomly chosen fingerprints
ξ and varying hyperparameters for CIFAR-10. The mean
AUC-ROC for all attacks is 98%− 100%, with the standard
deviation being less than 1%. This indicates that the per-
formance of NeuralFP is not very sensitive to the chosen
fingerprint directions and shows that neural networks can
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learn complex patterns along arbitrary directions.
Furthermore, the test accuracy with NeuralFP for CIFAR-10
is 85±1% and for MNIST is in the range 99.3±0.1%. This
is similar to the accuracy obtained when training the same
models without fingerprints, illustrating that fingerprinting
does not degrade prediction performance on the test-set,
while the high AUC-ROC indicates that the fingerprints
generalize well to the test-set, but not to adversarials.
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Figure 5. Fingerprint losses on 100 random test (blue) and adver-
sarial (red) CIFAR-10 images. We see a clear separation in loss,
illustrating that NeuralFP is effective across many thresholds τ .
3.3. Robustness to Choice of Fingerprints
Instead of simple ∆yi,j , we can encode more complex fin-
gerprints. For instance, we trained a network on CIFAR-10
using random ∆yi,j : for each ∆xi, if x is in class k:
∆yi,kl 6=k = −0.235p,∆yi,kl=k = 0.7p. (28)
Here p is a random variable with Pr(p = 1) = 0.5 and
Pr(p = −1) = 0.5 that is resampled for each ∆xi, making
it prohibitively hard for a brute-force attacker to guess. For
this NFP, we achieve AUC-ROC of > 95% across attacks
with N = 30,  = 0.05, without extensive tuning.
3.4. Robustness to Adaptive Whitebox-Attackers
We further considered an adaptive attacker that has knowl-
edge of the predetermined fingerprints and model weights,
similar to (Carlini & Wagner, 2017a). Here, the adaptive
attacker (Adaptive-CW-L2) tries to find an adversarial ex-
ample x′ that also minimizes the fingerprint-loss, attacking
a CIFAR-10 model trained with NeuralFP. To this end, the
CW-L2 objective is modified as:
min
x′
‖x− x′‖2 + γ (LCW (x′) + Lfp (x′, y∗, ξ; θ)) (29)
Here, y∗ is the label-vector, γ ∈ [10−3, 106] is a scalar
found through a bisection search, Lfp is the fingerprint-loss
we trained on and LCW is an objective encouraging mis-
classification. Under this threat model, NeuralFP achieves
an AUC-ROC of 98.79% against Adaptive-CW-L2, with
N = 30 and  = 0.006 for a set of unseen test-samples
(1024 pre-test) and the corresponding adversarial examples.
In contrast to other defenses that are vulnerable to Adaptive-
CW-L2 (Carlini & Wagner, 2017a), we find that NeuralFP
is robust even under this whitebox-attack threat model.
4. Related Work
Several forms of defense to adversarial examples have
been proposed, including adversarial training, detection and
reconstructing images using adversarial networks (Meng
& Chen, 2017). However, (Carlini & Wagner, 2017a;b)
showed many defenses are still vulnerable. (Madry et al.,
2017) employs robust-optimization techniques to minimize
the maximal loss the adversary can achieve through first-
order attacks. (Raghunathan et al., 2018; Kolter & Wong,
2017) train on convex relaxations of the network to maxi-
mize robustness. Although these works are complementary
to NeuralFP, they do not scale very well. Several other
recent defenses attempt to make robust predictions based
by relying on randomization (Cihang Xie, 2018), introduc-
ing non-linearity that is not differentiable (Jacob Buckman,
2018) and by relying on Generative Adversarial Networks
(Yang Song, 2018; Pouya Samangouei, 2018) for denoising
images. Instead, we focus on detecting adversarial attacks.
Detection. (Xingjun Ma, 2018) detect adversarial sam-
ples using an auxiliary logistic regression classifier, which
is trained to use an expansion-based measure, local intrinsic
dimensionality (LID). A similar approach to detection is
based on Kernel Density (KD) and Bayesian-Uncertainty
(BU) using artifacts from pre-trained networks (Feinman
et al., 2017). In contrast with these methods, NeuralFP en-
codes information into the network response during training,
and does not depend on auxiliary detectors.
5. Discussion and Future Work
Our experiments suggest that NeuralFP is an effective
method for safe-guarding against the strongest known state-
of-the-art adversarial attacks. However, there is room for
improvement as we do not achieve 100% detection rates.
An interesting line of future work is to explore if total de-
tection can be achieved via principled approaches to choos-
ing the NFP. Although empirical evidence suggests Neu-
ralFP is effective, an open question is if stronger attacks
can be developed that can fool NeuralFP or if it can be
proved that NeuralFP is invulnerable to adversarial pertur-
bations. Other interesting avenues include using NeuralFP
for robust prediction and extending it to domains beyond
image-processing that have been shown to be vulnerable to
Detecting Adversarial Examples via Neural Fingerprinting
adversarial attacks.
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Layer Parameters
Convolution + ReLU + BatchNorm 11× 11× 64
MaxPool 3× 3
Convolution + ReLU + BatchNorm 5× 5× 192
MaxPool 3× 3
Convolution + ReLU + BatchNorm 3× 3× 384
MaxPool 3× 3
Convolution + ReLU + BatchNorm 3× 3× 256
MaxPool 3× 3
Convolution + ReLU + BatchNorm 3× 3× 156
MaxPool 3× 3
Fully Connected + ReLU + BatchNorm 3072
Dropout -
Fully Connected + ReLU + BatchNorm 1024
Dropout -
Softmax 20
Table 2. MiniImagenet-20 Model Used
Layer Parameters
Convolution + ReLU + BatchNorm 5× 5× 32
MaxPool 2× 2
Convolution + ReLU + BatchNorm 5× 5× 64
MaxPool 2× 2
Fully Connected + ReLU + BatchNorm 200
Fully Connected + ReLU + BatchNorm 200
Softmax 10
Table 3. MNIST Model Used
Layer Parameters
Convolution + ReLU + BatchNorm 3× 3× 32
Convolution + ReLU + BatchNorm 3× 3× 64
MaxPool 2× 2
Convolution + ReLU + BatchNorm 3× 3× 128
Convolution + ReLU + BatchNorm 3× 3× 128
MaxPool 2× 2
Fully Connected + ReLU + BatchNorm 256
Fully Connected + ReLU + BatchNorm 256
Softmax 10
Table 4. CIFAR Model Used
6. Appendix
Note: Code for CW-adaptive is based on code fromhttps:
//github.com/carlini/nn_robust_attacks.
Code for the other attacks was obtained from the paper
(Xingjun Ma, 2018).
6.1. MNIST
For MNIST, we use the model described in Table 3.
6.2. CIFAR-10
For CIFAR-10, we use the model described in Table 4
6.3. MiniImagenet-20
MiniAlexNet Model We use a model similar to AlexNet
for MiniImagenet-20. The model used is described in Table
2
MiniImagenet-20 classes We use images from the
following 20 ImageNet classes for our experiments:
n01558993, n02795169, n03062245,
n03272010, n03980874, n04515003
n02110063, n02950826, n03146219,
n03400231, n04146614, n04612504,
n02443484, n02981792, n03207743,
n03476684, n04443257, n07697537
